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HCKPATI1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S4 15 Cr. 867 RMB 4 V. 5 MEHMET HAKAN ATILLA, 6 Defendant. -----x 7 8 9 December 20, 2017 8:20 a.m. 10 11 12 Before: 13 HON. RICHARD M. BERMAN, District Judge 14 and a jury 15 16 17 **APPEARANCES** 18 JOON H. KIM, United States Attorney for the 19 Southern District of New York MICHAEL DENNIS LOCKARD, 20 SIDHARDHA KAMARAJU, DAVID WILLIAM DENTON, JR., 21 DEAN CONSTANTINE SOVOLOS, Assistant United States Attorneys 22 23 24 25

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(Trial resumed)

(In open court; jury not present)

MS. FLEMING: Judge we've also reached an agreement on how to do the indictment thing if it's okay with you, how to send the indictment back, just send the charging party indictment back instead of the whole front part.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. DENTON: So we're working on a redacted indictment that's just the charging language.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DENTON: And then we'll bring that up.

MS. FLEMING: We gave Christine just the bribery.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to go back down, then, because you obviously have to read this. This draft incorporates what we talked about yesterday. It does entail the bribery and all that stuff, and you may as well just call it a redacted -- not redacted, but a copy of the indictment. If it's still a copy of the indictment, just leave the language.

MR. DENTON: I think you can just refer to a copy of the legal charges in the indictment.

THE COURT: Fine, something like that. I have some edits, taking some underlining out. That's an editorial for me to read but not for them.

MS. FLEMING: Okay.

THE COURT: Yes and some other thing. Let's put some things on the record, then.

MS. FLEMING: Sure, whatever you'd like.

THE COURT: So we'll get that out of the way.

MS. FLEMING: We will waive Mr. Atilla's presence on the record.

THE COURT: Okay. So I guess it's my inadvertence. I didn't send you a copy of the updated charges reflecting what we discussed yesterday, but we are preparing copies now, and you can take a look at that. We'll push back the conference until you're able to do that.

There is a motion for a mistrial in writing from the defense based on one of the questions that Mr. Denton asked yesterday of Mr. Atilla. That was, I believe, the subject of an interim ruling at sidebar. I'm not sure, but in any event, what we really do need is to have the government respond in writing, since it's an application for a mistrial. So I did endorse the defense letter asking the government to respond by 5:00 p.m. today.

MR. DENTON: We'll do that, your Honor. We'll see if we can do it even a little sooner.

MS. FLEMING: Judge, can I tell you why? Because in the absence of a mistrial, we really think that at least the Court needs to give a curative instruction on what happened with that question.

THE COURT: Well, I'll entertain a proposal --1 2 MS. FLEMING: Okay. 3 THE COURT: -- as to what I would say. Okay. And 4 you'll see if the government agrees with that. 5 I think I ruled on the record with respect to the 6 so-called jailhouse tapes yesterday. 7 MS. FLEMING: I don't think so. THE COURT: Did I not? 8 9 MS. FLEMING: No, you did it in the back. 10 THE COURT: So anyway, I was going to say it probably 11 is appropriate for me to do a written ruling, and I'm in the 12 process of having one of the clerks draft something. So that's 13 two. 14 I did speak to juror No. 10 yesterday, as we 15 discussed, and I excused him. And that's the juror, you'll recall, that during voir dire said he had a trip coming in 16 17 January and I guess I -- I think we discussed it. I can't 18 remember if we did, but.... 19 MR. ROCCO: We did. 20 THE COURT: Assured him, so to speak, that his trip 21 would not be interrupted. Since it's already Wednesday, nobody 22 knows how long deliberations would go, if they began and didn't 23 get it completed by Friday, his trip would be in jeopardy, and

Then, a couple of hours later, I got a call from a

it would be a big mess; so we excused him.

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another juror, who is sick. So I got a voicemail actually about 8:00 or 9:00 last night from that juror, and we didn't get back to him. This morning he called chambers, and I took the call. I was there at the time, around 7:00, and he said it's that juror. He hadn't heard back, and my intention was somebody would call him and say he would have to have a doctor's note or have to be sick, et cetera, et cetera.

He said he had 103 fever and the flu and a doctor's note. He said he had a very good experience here, and I'm not joking, he sincerely said that it was a wonderful experience, and he really regretted that he couldn't come. And I said, well, don't come, obviously, if you're sick. So we're down another juror. I think we have one or two to spare, maybe one. So anyway, that's where things stand. I hope you will confirm I did the right thing with the sick juror.

MS. FLEMING: Absolutely.

MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor.

MR. HARRISON: Judge, which juror was it, do you know?

THE COURT: I think it was juror No. 11, in the 11th seat. He called himself juror No. 13, but I think those numbers have changed, and I think he's the fellow who was sitting next to the juror that is going on the trip. I'm tempted to say something funny, but I usually --

MR. ROCCO: Regret it?

THE COURT: I usually regret it; so I won't, and it

may not even be funny. So, okay.

So you tell me when you'd be ready. Look through the charges.

There is one other thing, which I don't know if it's going to be possible to happen, but very early yesterday morning, it turns out, before trial, a very dear friend of mine passed away. So there is a memorial service today at 1:00, which I'm toying with whether I could go or not and then come back.

So I think, realistically, I'd be out of the office from 11:30 to, the latest I think would be 3:30. So, first, I want to see if it would be okay with you. What we would do in the interim is, I would, first of all, tell the jury I'll be out, and they should go about their deliberation business, but that I personally wouldn't be here for that period of time. They should do what they would normally do, and if we get any notes, Christine would text them to me or e-mail them to me. And in the worst case, we wouldn't be able to act on the notes unless we could figure out a way that -- you know, who knows what the note might say.

Then, as a backup, I thought I would ask if one of -I don't think it would be necessary -- one of my colleagues to,
you know, if there was some sort of emergency that required a
judge, to be here or something as a result of one of the notes
or whatever, if that's okay with you.

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So there's a couple of pieces to that, seeking your okay. I'm not sure I'm going to do it. The way I would do it is I would get a car, an Uber, or something like that, and have them wait for me at the funeral home.

MR. ROCCO: Can we take a moment to talk about that, your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Pause)

Incidentally, I should add one more thing. Don't feel obliged to say yes. No, no, just because you think I'm asking. If you think in any way it could disadvantage Mr. Atilla, then I wouldn't do it. So only if you're comfortable, from his point of view, would that be okay.

MS. FLEMING: Judge, we all think you should go. What we're debating is we don't think you ought to tell the jury you're not going to be here. In the event there is no note, no harm, no foul. If there is a note, we can just deal with it, and if we have to delay something until you get back, we delay it.

MR. ROCCO: If there's an emergency, I have no problem having a colleague cover it.

THE COURT: Okay. Sometimes they send nervous if they send a note and then they send another note and say, where's the answer to our note.

MR. DENTON: I think for that reason it's probaly

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better, actually, to tell them that the Court will not be available to respond to notes for that time period.

THE COURT: No?

MS. FLEMING: I don't think they should know you're not going to be here. If there's a note, we'll deal with it or you'll deal with it with them. You're still going to be dealing with the note. I don't want them to feel the pressure of they shouldn't be sending anything out for three or four hours.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand that.

MR. DENTON: I'll just say, I think the more common situation that this arises is with judges who observe lunch breaks scrupulously, and tell the jury that, you know, from 1:00 to 2:00 you should feel free to give any notes you have to the marshal, but you should be aware but the parties will not be available and the Court will not be available to respond to them until 2:00.

This is just a slightly longer version of that, and so I don't think there's any reason to tell them don't send out notes, but I think informing them that the Court and the parties will not be able to address them seems reasonable so that they're not wondering what is going on.

> THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll think about it.

MS. FLEMING: The reason I just don't like that, Judge, is I don't want to discourage them from sending a note.

1 THE COURT: I see your point. MR. HARRISON: Just the other thing, Judge, is they 2 3 could conceivably, during that time, send out a note that we could deal, with even though your Honor is not physically here. 4 5 If they say we would like to see exhibit whatever, we could get 6 on the phone with you, if necessary, and agree that we can send 7 the exhibit in or whatever so things could still get done. And that's a common type of note to get during the early hours. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. So you probably should run that by 10 Mr. Atilla, too. 11 MS. FLEMING: Yes, we will. 12 THE COURT: Okay. So, yes, that's it. You'll let me 13 know when you're ready to talk about the charges. 14 (Pause) 15 THE COURT: Did you get copies yet? 16 MS. FLEMING: We have one set, Judge. 17 MR. ROCCO: One. 18 THE COURT: I'll give you each two. 19 MR. ROCCO: Thank you, Judge. 20 MR. DENTON: Thank you, Judge. 21 (Pause) 22 THE COURT: Do you mind going into the robing room 23 because there's press and audience outside. 24 MR. ROCCO: Sure.

MS. FLEMING: Do you want us to review it first and

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then go in?

THE COURT: I'm going to go downstairs; so you can be there. Actually, I suppose you could stay here. We'll just keep them out.

MS. FLEMING: Okay.

THE COURT: You should know that these are live. I didn't realize.

MS. FLEMING: So I can't yell at Mr. Rocco?

(Pause)

THE COURT: Are you guys all set?

MR. ROCCO: Just a little bit, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I think the only changes in there are the ones we agreed to yesterday.

(Pause)

(In open court; jury not present)

THE COURT: Please be seated. So as is my practice, we had the balance of the jury charge conference in the robing room without a stenographer, and it is also my practice to allow the parties to indicate for the record, with the stenographer, any objections that they have remaining to the jury instructions that I'm about to read to the jury. So we'll start with the defense, and you may state any objections that you have.

Before you do, Mr. Rocco, I indicated to the parties off the record and now on the record, I don't know if it was on

the record before, that there has been an application for a mistrial, and I endorsed the defense application today and asked for a government written response by 5:00 p.m. today.

No. 2, I told the parties that there would be a written decision today or tomorrow, certainly whenever there's time, no later than tomorrow, with respect to the jailhouse conversations of Mr. Zarrab.

And with that, Mr. Rocco, if there are no objections, that means that the parties agreed with the instructions, with the exception of those that they may have objections to.

MR. ROCCO: Thank you, your Honor. So on page 46 -these are lengthy; so I will read them slowly -- at the bottom
of the page --

THE COURT: You have to speak into the microphone, I think.

MR. ROCCO: At the bottom of the page, on page 46, we object to the language at the end of the first full paragraph on the page and ask that the last sentence of that paragraph, starting "In addition" — the sentence starting "In addition" should be stricken, and the sentence that should be stricken reads: "In addition, during the relevant time period, the sanctions allowed penalties against foreign financial institutions with bank accounts in the United States if those foreign financial institutions violated certain rules on assisting transactions with or for the benefit of Iran."

On --

THE COURT: May I make this suggestion? Without waiving any rights, would you be comfortable just reading the language that you think should be in, instead of saying "on page" or do you want to do it page by page?

MR. ROCCO: It's easier for me to do it that way.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROCCO: Because that's how I noted it.

THE COURT: Okay. No problem.

MR. ROCCO: I'll do it as quickly as I can.

THE COURT: No problem.

MR. ROCCO: On the next page, page 47, after the enumerated — the paragraph starting "Third," we would like to add a paragraph denominated "fourth," saying: "Fourth, that the activity for which the defendant is charged had some connection to the United States either by involving a United States person in the conduct or by causing goods, services or technology to be exported or re-exported from the United States as part of the defendant's scheme. In other words, the violative conduct has to go through the United States. A United States correspondent account not connected to the conduct at issue is not enough."

And at the end of the next paragraph, starting, "as I have mentioned," adding a full sentence saying: "Conspiring to do activity that is merely sanctionable is not a crime."

On page 48, at the end of the first full paragraph, add this sentence: "If you find Mr. Atilla did not know the transactions were sent through the U.S., then you must acquit him on the charge of conspiring to export U.S. services to Iran or to the government of Iran."

On page 49, at the end of the first full paragraph, starting "Second," add the sentence: "Mere statements that fail to disclose sanctionable activity are not sufficient to convict because they are not transactions within the meaning of the evasion avoidance regulation."

And the sentence starting the third paragraph on the page: "Beginning on July 31, 2012," the word "required" should be changed to "permitted."

On the following page, at the end of the paragraph ——
I'm sorry, at the end of the runover paragraph, following the
words "the government of Iran," adding the sentence: "Two
things to keep in mind: First, the activity I just described
could only get a person sanctioned, not convicted of a crime;
and second, if the purchaser or acquirer was a private Iranian
individual or company, it would not be sanctionable."

At the end of the next paragraph, add the following sentence: "The conduct I have just described would have, at most, led to the financial institution being sanctioned, not convicted of a crime, and if the conduct was conducted with the proceeds of sales of natural gas by Iran, it would not have

been sanctionable."

At the end of the next paragraph, which starts

"beginning on July 1st, 2013," at the end of that paragraph add

the language: "In this period, if the foreign financial

institution facilitated the payment for the sale of gold before

July 31st, 2013, it would not have been sanctionable or

prosecutable, even if the shipment of gold occurred after

July 1, 2013."

And following that, striking the language starting with "Fourth" through the first runover paragraph onto page 51, and that's it, your Honor. Thank you for your patience.

THE COURT: Very well. Anybody else from the defense?

MR. HARRISON: Just one second, please, your Honor.

(Pause)

Judge, just for the record, it's already in the record, but we do object to the conscious avoidance charge.

THE COURT: Yes. How about the government?

MR. DENTON: The government requests that the Court retain the so-called Pinkerton instruction originally included in the instructions at pages 29 to 31 distributed this morning. Obviously, the Court's instruction is a correct statement of the applicable law. We think it's particularly appropriate in this case, where it is an entirely appropriate conclusion for the jury to reach that bank fraud and money laundering, as substantive offenses, were the reasonably foreseeable acts in

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co-conspirators in furtherance of the charged conspiracies, both to obstruct the enforcement of the sanctions laws and to violate the IEEPA.

THE COURT: So in the conference that we had, I agreed with the defense to delete that instruction. Among other reasons, I thought it was very complicated for jurors or any of us to grasp, and I just thought it would cause more confusion than not.

I take it the government is opposed to the changes suggested by Mr. Harrison and Mr. Rocco?

MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor. We believe the conscious avoidance instruction is appropriate, and that the Court's instructions on IEEPA is an accurate statement of the law.

THE COURT: Is the defense in disagreement with the removal of the so-called Pinkerton charge?

MR. ROCCO: We agree with the removal of the Pinkerton charge.

THE COURT: You agree with the removal.

MR. ROCCO: Yes.

THE COURT: So I think that's it. We worked fast, but not that fast. So we're retyping the corrections to the instructions, and when that's ready, we'll call in the jury.

MS. FLEMING: There were still just two issues that we had to discuss, one was the one we discussed before that you

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asked us to discuss with the client. He's fine with it. has no issues.

THE COURT: Okay. Great.

MS. FLEMING: And the second was that we had requested a curative instruction. We don't think it cures the issue that was before the jury, and we would move for a mistrial. can't agree on the language.

THE COURT: Was that in your motion?

MS. FLEMING: No. We don't think it cures it, but if the Court is considering doing a curative instruction, it's the last clear chance.

THE COURT: Did you discuss that with the government? MS. FLEMING: We showed what we would propose as language.

THE COURT: Hold on one second. So did you agree with --

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, there's one sentence in the proposed instruction that we disagree with.

I'll also note that, I think, that given that early in the Court's charge you instruct them that questions are not evidence and that, in particular, any question that was objected to or stricken should not be considered, that a separate instruction is not necessary.

Right. So, why don't you take a look at THE COURT: her language and see if there is consensus. I think that it's hard to say without seeing the written opposition to the motion. As a gut reaction, gut-level reaction, one question asked and not answered and objected to and the objection granted and directed the question be stricken from the record, in my experience, certainly is adequate, along with what I say in these instructions generally. But if you both can agree on something, we have a couple of minutes. Since we don't have the instructions done yet, I'd be happy to consider it.

MR. HARRISON: Judge, I just had a couple more quick --

THE COURT: One second.

(Pause)

MR. ROCCO: Your Honor, so we spent a minute talking about the proposed curative instruction. We discussed it before we had our conference on the charge. We cannot agree. I can give you what our proposed language is.

THE COURT: I'll take a look, but I think I'm going to rely on -- well, first, I'm going to see the opposition, but as I said before, one question that hasn't been answered and that was directed be stricken from the record, I can't imagine -- there may be some question that could give rise to a mistrial but certainly not that one, in my opinion.

MR. ROCCO: Well, that's the issue we addressed in the letter, and we understand that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

1 MR. ROCCO: But we think the question was a peculiar question, and that's why we raised it to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear you. I'll take what you have.

MR. ROCCO: We didn't write it out for your Honor, or I can give you by hand. You're a wise man, Judge. We'll write it out. Thank you.

THE COURT: That's it. Store is closed.

MR. HARRISON: Judge?

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THE COURT: Store is closed, Mr. Harrison.

MR. HARRISON: I just wanted to put on the record a couple of objections that we discussed, just quick ones that we discussed, for the record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRISON: On page 16 of the current draft, we had requested that the second sentence on the "Foreign Evidence Admitted" section be struck.

On page 42, defense had requested that in the run-on sentence at the top of page 42, that either the words "improper" or "unlawful" be inserted before "purpose."

And then on page 52, we had asked that the first full sentence be stricken, the sentence that starts "The defendant does not have to know" because it's our understanding that, under IEEPA, the defendant does have to know that it's unlawful.

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THE COURT: Okay. Thanks a lot. So give me a couple of minutes, and we'll see what we can do.

(Recess)

THE COURT: We're going to call in the jury now.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Great. Please be seated, everybody. mentioned to you yesterday, and as I'm about to give the jury instructions, I am going to give a complete set to each of you to take into the jury room at the conclusion of this portion of the trial.

So, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you've now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the lawyers for the parties.

My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine them, just as it has been my duty to preside over the trial and decide what testimony and what evidence is relevant under the law for your consideration.

On these legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. If any attorney has stated a legal principle different from any that I state in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow.

You should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law, but you should consider my instructions as a

whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room. As I mentioned, you will receive a copy of these instructions verbatim, along with a verdict sheet to be filled out by the jury to take with you into the jury room. Your decision, or your verdict, must be unanimous.

You should not, any of you, be concerned about the wisdom of any rule that I state, regardless of any opinion that you may have as to what the law may be or ought to be. It would violate your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than the one I give you.

Your role, as I've said before, is to consider and decide the fact issues in this case. You, the members of the jury, are the sole and exclusive determiners of the facts. You pass upon the evidence. You determine the credibility or believability of the witnesses. You resolve whatever conflicts may exist in the testimony. You draw whatever reasonable inferences and conclusions you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them, and you determine the weight of the evidence.

In determining the facts, you must rely upon your own independent recollection of the evidence. What the lawyers have said in their opening statements, in their closing arguments, in their objections, or in their questions is not evidence. Nor is anything I may have said during the trial or may say during these instructions about a fact issue, to be

taken instead of your own independent recollection.

What I say is not evidence. In this connection, remember that a question put to a witness is never evidence.

Only the answer is evidence. But you may not consider any answer as to which I sustained an objection or that I directed you to disregard or that I directed be struck from the record.

If there is any difference or contradiction between what any lawyer has said in their arguments to you and what you decide the evidence showed, or between anything I may have said and what you decide the evidence showed, it is your view of the evidence, not the lawyers' and not mine, that controls.

I also ask you to draw no inference from the fact that upon occasion I may have asked questions of certain witnesses. These questions were intended only for clarification or to move things along, and certainly were not intended to suggest any opinions on my part as to the verdict you should render or whether any of the witnesses may have been more credible than any of the other witnesses. It is important that you understand that I wish to convey no opinion as to the verdict you should render in this case and that if you, nevertheless, believe that I did convey an opinion, you should not, in any way, follow it.

In determining the facts, you must weigh and consider the evidence without regard to sympathy, prejudice or passion for or against any party, and without regard to what the

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reaction of the parties or the public to your verdict may be. I will later discuss with you how to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.

I remind you that the indictment in this case is not evidence. It merely describes the charges made against the defendant. It is a set of accusations. It may not be considered by you as evidence of the quilt of the defendant. Only the evidence, or lack of evidence, decides that issue.

A copy of the statutory allegations in the indictment will be furnished to you when you begin your deliberations. summary, the counts set forth in the indictment allege as follows:

Count One charges that from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant, Mr. Atilla, participated in a conspiracy to defraud the United States. It is alleged that the defendant agreed with others to impair, impede and obstruct the lawful and legitimate governmental functions and operations of the United States Department of the Treasury, in violation of what's called Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

That's a summary. These are each going to be summaries of the counts set forth in the indictment.

Count Two charges that, from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant participated in a conspiracy to violate a license, order,

regulation or prohibition issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, referred to in this trial as IEEPA, I-E-E-P-A.

Count Three charges, in summary, that from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant engaged in the substantive offense of bank fraud.

I'm going to explain the difference between a substantive offense and conspiracy offenses in a couple of minutes.

Count Four charges that, from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant participated in a conspiracy to commit bank fraud.

Count Five charges that, from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant engaged in the substantive count of money laundering.

Count Six charges that, from at least in or about 2010, up to and including 2015, the defendant participated in the conspiracy to commit money laundering. Six counts.

The evidence from which you are to decide what the facts are in this case consists of, first, the sworn testimony of witnesses on both direct and cross-examination; two, the documents and exhibits that were received in evidence; and three, any stipulations of testimony. Nothing else is evidence.

You should draw no inference or conclusion, for or

against, any party by reason of lawyers making objections or my rulings on such objections. Counsel have not only the right but the duty to make legal objections when they think that such objections are appropriate. You should not be swayed for or against either side simply because counsel for any party has chosen to make an objection. Nor should you be swayed by any ruling I made on an objection. Whether or not I may have sustained more objections for one side or the other has no bearing on your function to consider all of the evidence that was admitted.

Further, do not concern yourself with what was said at sidebar conferences or during my discussions with counsel. Nor does it make any difference whether any lawyer or I asked for a sidebar conference. Those discussions related to rulings of law and not to matters of fact.

At times, I may have admonished a lawyer or a witness or directed a witness to be responsive to questions or to keep his or her voice up. At times, I may have questioned a witness myself or made comments to a lawyer. Any questions that I asked or instructions or comments that I gave were intended only to move things along or to clarify the presentation of evidence and to bring out something which I thought was unclear.

You should draw no inference or conclusion of any kind, favorable or unfavorable, with respect to any witness or

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any party in the case by reason of any comment, any question or any instruction of mine. Nor should you infer that I have any views as to the credibility of any witness, as to the weight of the evidence, or as to how you should decide any issue that is before you. That is entirely your role.

The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the charges in the indictment. As a result of his plea of not guilty, the burden is upon the prosecution, which is to say the government, to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant for the simple reason that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of testifying himself or calling any witnesses or of locating or producing any evidence.

The law presumes the defendant to be innocent of the charges against him. I, therefore, instruct you that the defendant is to be presumed by you to be innocent when the trial began and throughout your deliberations and until such time, if it comes, that you, as a jury, are unanimously satisfied that the government has proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant unless you, as jurors, are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt, after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in this case. If the government fails to sustain its burden as to

the defendant, you must find the defendant not quilty.

I have said that the government must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the question naturally is: What is reasonable doubt? The words almost define themselves. It is a doubt based upon reason and common sense. It is a doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence. It is a doubt which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his or her own life.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs. A reasonable doubt is not a caprice or a whim. It is not a speculation or a suspicion. It is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty, and it is not sympathy.

In a criminal case, the burden is, at all times, upon the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not require the government to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict. The burden never shifts to the defendant, which means that it is always the government's burden to prove each of the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

If, after fair and impartial consideration of all of

the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to acquit the defendant. On the other hand, if, after a fair and impartial consideration of all of the evidence, you are satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you should vote to convict.

You have had the opportunity to observe all the witnesses, including the expert witnesses, and it is now your job to decide how believable each witness was in his or her own testimony. You are the sole determiners of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of witness testimony.

So how do you determine where the truth lies? You should use all the tests for truthfulness that you would use in determining matters of importance to you in your everyday lives. You should consider any bias or hostility that a witness may have shown for or against any party, as well as any interest the witness has in the outcome of the case. It is your duty to consider whether the witness has permitted any such bias or interest to color his or her testimony.

You should consider the opportunity that the witness had to see, hear, and know the things about which they testified, the accuracy of their memory, their candor or lack of candor, their intelligence, their reasonableness and probability of their testimony, and its consistency, or lack of consistency, and its corroboration, or lack of corroboration, with other believable testimony.

You watched the witnesses testify. Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your determination. How did the witness appear? What was the witness' demeanor while testifying? Often, it is not what people say, but how they say it that moves us.

In deciding whether to believe a witness, keep in mind that people sometimes forget things. You need to consider, therefore, whether in such a situation the witness' testimony reflects an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional falsehood, and that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only a small detail. It is not the number of witnesses called in a case but, rather, their credibility when called to the witness stand that is directly at issue.

In addition, the fact that a witness may be employed as a law enforcement official does not mean that his or her testimony is deserving of more or less consideration, or a greater or lesser weight, than that of an ordinary witness.

If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely as to a material fact, that is to say an important matter, the law permits you to disregard completely the entire testimony of that witness upon the principle that one who testifies falsely about one material fact, is likely to testify falsely about everything.

You are not required, however, to consider such a

witness as totally unworthy of belief. You may accept so much of the witness' testimony as you deem true and disregard what you feel is false. As the sole judges of the facts, you must decide which of the witnesses you will believe, what portion of their testimony you accept and what weight you will give to it.

You've heard from the government witness, Reza Zarrab, who testified that he actually committed crimes in the past, including the crimes charged in the indictment in this case.

The government argues, as it is permitted to do, that it must take its witnesses as it finds them. It argues that frequently only people who themselves take part in criminal activity have the knowledge required to show criminal behavior by others.

For those very reasons, the law allows the use of testimony by people who have committed crimes. Indeed, it is the law in federal courts that such testimony may be enough, in and of itself, for a conviction, if the jury finds that the testimony establishes guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, it is also the case that such testimony is of such a nature that it must be scrutinized with great care and viewed with particular caution when you decide how much of the testimony to believe.

I've given you some general instructions on credibility, and I will not repeat them all here. However, let

me say a few things to consider during your deliberations on the subject of testimony from a cooperating witness.

You should ask yourselves whether the witness would benefit more by lying or by telling the truth. Was the witness' testimony made up in any way because the witness believed or hoped that he would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely? Or did the witness believe his interests would best be served by testifying truthfully? If you believe that the witness was motivated by hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one that would cause him to lie, or was it one that would cause him to tell the truth? Did

You should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence and what weight, if any, you want to give to the witness' testimony.

these motivations color the witness' testimony?

Also, you heard testimony about an agreement between the government and the cooperating witness. I must caution you that it is of no concern of yours why the government made an agreement with the witness. Your sole concern is whether a witness has given truthful testimony, in part or in whole, here in this courtroom before you.

There has been evidence introduced at trial that the government used, and that was Mr. Huseyin Korkmaz, as a confidential source in this case. I instruct you that there is nothing improper in the government's use of confidential

sources and, indeed, certain criminal conduct never would be detected without the use of such confidential sources.

You, therefore, should not concern yourself with how you personally feel about the use of confidential sources because that is really beside the point. Put another way, your concern is to decide whether the government has proved the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the evidence was obtained by the use of confidential sources.

On the other hand, where confidential sources testify, as happened here, the testimony must be examined with greater scrutiny than the testimony of an ordinary witness. You should consider whether the confidential source received any benefits or promises from the government which would motivate them to testify falsely against the defendant. For example, they may believe that they will only continue to receive these benefits if they produce evidence of criminal conduct.

If you decide to accept their testimony, after considering it in the light of all the evidence in the case, then you may give it whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves.

You've also heard testimony from what we call expert witnesses. They included Lisa Palluconi, she testified as to Iran sanctions, as an Iran sanctions program as an expert; also, Mark Dubowitz testified about Iran and Iranian sanctions

as an expert; Anush Djahanbani, D-j-a-h-a-n-b-a-n-i, testified as a foreign language expert, the language was Farsi; and Bulent Bulut, B-u-l-u-t, also a foreign language expert testified about Turkish language.

An expert is allowed to express his or her opinion on matters about which he or she has specialized knowledge or training. Expert testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is experience in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.

In weighing the expert's testimony, you may consider the expert's qualifications, his or her opinions, his or her reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply when you are deciding whether to believe a witness' testimony.

You may give expert testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all of the evidence in this case. You should not, however, accept this witness testimony, the expert witness' testimony, merely because he or she is an expert. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you, the jurors.

There are two kinds of evidence; one is called direct and the other circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as testimony by a witness about what that

witness personally experienced through his or her own senses, which is to say something seen, felt, touched, heard or tasted. Direct evidence may also be in the form of an exhibit, where the fact to be proven is its present existence or condition.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts. There's the simple example of circumstantial evidence which I use, and others do also, other judges do, as well, and it goes something like this.

Assume that when you came into the courthouse this morning, the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that the courtroom blinds were drawn, as they are, and you could not look outside. But assume further that, as you are sitting here, someone walks into the courtroom with an umbrella that is dripping wet, and then a few minutes later another person also were to enter the courtroom, let's assume, with a wet umbrella. Now, you cannot look outside the courtroom on the facts that I gave you because the blinds are drawn, and so you cannot see whether or not it's raining for yourselves. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts which I suggested to you and asked you to assume, it would be reasonable for you to conclude that it had been raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense

from one established fact the existence or non-existence of some other fact.

The matter of drawing inferences from facts in evidence is not a matter of guesswork or speculation. An inference is a logical, factual conclusion which you might reasonably draw from other facts that have been proved.

Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence, and the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that your verdict must be based on all the evidence presented.

You have heard testimony about evidence that was recovered as a result of a foreign, in this case Turkish, investigation. This evidence was properly admitted into this case and may be properly considered by you. Whether you approve or disapprove of how it was obtained should not enter into your deliberations because I now instruct you that the use of this evidence is entirely lawful. However, it is up to you, the jurors, to decide the weight, if any, to be provided by any foreign evidence.

We have, among the exhibits received in evidence, some documents that are redacted. Redacted means that part of the document or recording was taken out, and you are to concern yourself only with the part of the item that has been admitted into evidence. You should not consider any possible reasons

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why the other part of it has been deleted.

The defendant is, as reflected in the summary of counts that I mentioned earlier, charged in what are referred to as two substantive counts, and substantive counts are contrasted with what are called conspiracy counts, and they are as follows:

The two substantive counts are found in Count Three, which charges the defendant with the substantive offense of bank fraud, and Count Five, which charges the defendant with the substantive offense of money laundering.

For purposes of ease of your understanding of these instructions, as will become hopefully clear, I'm starting with the substantive counts and then following with the conspiracy counts. So there are two substantive counts and then four conspiracy counts, and I'll deal with them in that order. It's a little bit different order than is set forth in the indictment.

Although, as you've heard, this is not the order in which the counts are presented in the indictment, the ordering of the counts is of no legal significance in these instructions. So starting with the two substantive counts, and this is true of all of the counts, they are somewhat detailed; so bear with me.

Bank fraud, that's found in Count Three of the indictment. It's the substantive count. Count Three charges

that from, at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant executed and attempted to execute a scheme to defraud one or more United States financial institutions and, in particular, HSBC Bank U.S.A., Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, UBS Bank U.S.A., BNY Mellon, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase Bank, Bank of America and Wells Fargo Bank.

The defendant, as noted, is also charged with a separate count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and you should bear in mind that the law relating to bank fraud discussed here will also apply with regard to the conspiracy to commit bank fraud that is charged against the defendant, as will be explained when I discuss that alleged conspiracy.

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THE COURT: So that in fact is why I put the substantive counts first, because they, in two instances of the two counts, they also come up in conspiracies later on. So what I explain in connection with the substantive counts will also apply with the conspiracy that relates to those two counts.

So here are the elements of bank fraud. To meet its burden of proof with respect to bank fraud, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt three essential elements which I'll explain to you in some detail.

The first element of bank fraud is this: The first element that the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a bank, and here the banks again are HSBC Bank U.S.A., Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the Americas, UBS Bank U.S.A., BNY Mellon, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo Bank, or, this is in the alternative, (2) that he executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to obtain money owned by or under the custody and control of one or more of such banks, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises that were material to the scheme.

So let me say that again so you can follow it perhaps a little more easily.

The first element that the government must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant (1) executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a bank, the banks that I listed before, or (2) that he executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to obtain money owned by or under the custody and control of one or more of such banks by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises that were material to the scheme.

Before I define these terms for you, let me explain that the government needs to prove either of these two alternatives, one or two, that there existed a scheme or artifice to defraud a bank, or that there was a scheme or artifice to obtain money, funds, credits or asset under the custody or control of that bank by means of fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises. These two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive. If you find that either one of the schemes or artifices or both existed, then the first element of bank fraud is satisfied. However, you must be unanimous in your view as to the type of scheme or artifice that existed.

Let me explain these terms. A "scheme or artifice" is simply a plan, device or a course of conduct to accomplish an objective.

A "scheme to defraud a bank" is a pattern or course of conduct designed to deceive a bank into releasing money or property. It is a term that embraces all possible means --

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however ingenious, clever or crafty — by which a person seeks to gain some improper advantage. For example, a scheme to defraud can be accomplished through trickery, deceit, deception, or swindle. It includes intentional misrepresentation and false suggestion, suppression or concealment of the truth.

The second of the two types of schemes mentioned includes one to obtain a bank's money by means of a false or fraudulent pretense, representations or promises. government must show that these false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises were directed at the bank with the intention of deceiving it. The misrepresentations may be written, oral, or arise from a course of conduct intended to communicate false facts to the bank. The deceptive means that are prohibited are not limited to active misrepresentations or lies told to the bank. Just as affirmatively stating facts as true when the facts are not true may constitute a false representation, the law recognizes that false representations need not be based on spoken or written words alone. deception may arise from the intentional omission or concealment of facts that make what was written, said or done deliberately misleading.

False representations and pretenses must be material. We use the word "material" to distinguish between the kinds of statements we care about and those that are of no real

importance. So a material fact is one which reasonably would be expected to be capable of influencing a reasonable and prudent person relying on the statement in making a decision. That means that if you find a particular statement of fact to have been untruthful, before you can find that statement or omission to be material, you must also find that the statement or omission was one that would have been capable of influencing a reasonable person in making such a decision. Actual reliance by the bank on the representations is not required. It is sufficient if the misrepresentation is one that is capable of influencing the bank's decision and is intended to do so.

In order to establish the existence of a scheme, the government is not required to establish that the scheme actually succeeded — that is, that a schemer realized any gain from the scheme or that the intended victim suffered any loss. The issue is whether there was such a scheme. Thus, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the scheme succeeded, just that the scheme was devised and employed.

If you find that the government has sustained its burden of proof that a scheme to defraud a bank or to obtain money by false pretenses did exist as charged, you next should consider the second element of bank fraud. And that is as follows:

To meet its burden of proof with respect to the bank fraud, the second element that the government must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt is that the defendant executed, attempted to execute, or participated in the scheme, knowingly, willfully, and with specific intent to defraud the bank or to obtain money owned or possessed by the bank, or under the bank's custody or control.

To act with "intent to defraud" means to act willfully and with intent to deceive.

The government is not required to prove that the defendant intended permanently to deprive the banks of their property or that the banks suffered a loss or that the defendant personally profited by his acts. It is sufficient if the defendant intended through the scheme to defraud to obtain the use of the victim's money or property for a period of time, even if he ultimately intended to return it, or if the defendant intended to obtain the use of the victim's money or property by deliberately depriving them of information that was material to their decision on how to use or invest their money or property.

If you find that the defendant did not intend to deprive the banks of their property or that the bank suffered no loss or that the defendant did not profit by his acts, you may consider this evidence in determining whether the defendant had the intent to defraud the banks.

To "participate" in a scheme to defraud means to associate oneself with it with a view and intent to make it

succeed.

An act is done "knowingly" if it is done deliberately and purposefully. That is, a defendant's act must have been the product of his conscious objective, rather than the product of a mistake or accident or mere negligence, carelessness or recklessness or some other innocent reason.

And "willfully" means to act with knowledge that one's conduct is unlawful and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.

"Unlawfully" means simply contrary to law. A defendant need not have known that he or she was breaking any particular law or any particular rule. A defendant need only have been aware of the generally unlawful nature of his or her acts or plans.

I said there were three elements of bank fraud. That's two. Here's the third:

To meet its burden of proof with respect to bank fraud, the third and final element that the government must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the banks in question, HSBC Bank U.S.A., Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, UBS Bank U.S.A., BNY Mellon, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America and Wells Fargo Bank, that is, the banks that were subject of the scheme or artifice to defraud, were, at the time of the execution or attempted execution of the

fraudulent scheme, federally insured financial institutions.

This simply means that the banks deposits had to be insured by the United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

The government need not show that the defendant knew that the banks in question were federally insured to satisfy this third element.

So that's one count. I said there are six. I said you need patience. So, five to go.

So the second count is the second substantive count.

After we finish the second count, we'll turn to the conspiracy counts.

The second substantive count is found in Count Five of the indictment and it's called money laundering. The second substantive count is money laundering. Count Five of the indictment charges the defendant with unlawfully transporting or attempting to transport funds or monetary instruments to or from the United States, with an intent to promote certain criminal offenses. And that was done in violation of 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (a)(2)(A). This crime is commonly called money laundering.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (a)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part as follows:

Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer, a monetary instrument or funds from a place outside the United States to a

place in the United States, from or through a place outside the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, is guilty of an offense against the United States.

Apart from his alleged participation in substantive count of money laundering, as I said before, the defendant is also charged with a separate offense of a conspiracy to commit money laundering which will be discussed later on. You should bear in mind that the law relating to money laundering, that is to say, the substantive elements which I've been going over with you, those elements of money laundering discussed here also apply with regard to the conspiracy to commit money laundering also charged against the defendant.

In order to prove the defendant guilty of money laundering, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following two elements which I will describe in detail:

The first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant transported, transmitted or transferred, or attempted to transport, transmit or transfer, a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States.

Second, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did so with the intent to promote the

carrying out of a specified unlawful activity.

I'm going to discuss those two elements in more detail.

The first element of money laundering. The first element, which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the defendant transported, transmitted, or transferred or attempted to transport, transmit, or transfer, a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States, or to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States.

A "monetary instrument" includes, among other things, currency or a coin of the United States, for example U.S. dollars, or any other country, travelers checks, cashiers checks, bank checks, personal checks, investment securities, and other negotiable instruments.

"Funds" refers to money or negotiable paper which can be converted into currency.

"Transport," "transmit" and "transfer" are not really words that require definition. They are words that have an ordinary, every day meaning.

The government need not prove that the defendant physically carried the funds or monetary instruments in order to prove that the defendant is responsible for transporting or transmitting it. All that is required is proof that the

defendant caused the funds or monetary instrument to be transported, transmitted, or transferred.

I said there were two elements to money laundering.

Here's the second one: The second element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted with the intent to promote the carrying out of specified unlawful activity.

And I instruct you as a matter of law that the term "specified unlawful activity" includes (1) bank fraud and the conspiracy to commit bank fraud, as charged in Counts Three and Four respectively in the indictment, and (2) a conspiracy to violate the IEEPA as charged in Count Two.

To act knowingly and intentionally means to act deliberately and purposefully, not by mistake or accident, with a deliberate purpose of promoting, facilitating or assisting the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, namely here, (i) bank fraud and/or bank fraud conspiracy; and (ii) a conspiracy to violate IEEPA.

Now there is a concept that I want to explain to you which is referred to as "aiding and abetting" the substantive offenses of bank fraud and money laundering. So this applies to the two substantive counts which I've just explained to you.

With respect to the substantive bank fraud charge, Count Three of the indictment, and the substantive money laundering charge, Count Five of the indictment, I need to

instruct you about what is called aiding and abetting the commission of those crimes. Aiding and abetting is an alternative theory on which somebody can be convicted of a substantive crime. In other words, you may also find the defendant guilty of the bank fraud and/or the money laundering counts if you find that he aided and abetted the commission of those crimes.

The aiding and abetting statute is Section 2(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which provides that:

Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsel, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

Under the aiding and abetting statute, it is not necessary for the government to show that defendant himself personally committed the bank fraud or the money laundering with which he is charged in order for you to find him guilty.

A person who aids, abet, counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit an offense is just as guilty of that offense as if he committed it himself.

Accordingly, you may find the defendant guilty on the substantive crimes of bank fraud or money laundering if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proved that another person actually committed the crime, and that defendant knowingly aided and abetted that person in the commission of either of those offenses.

As you can see, the first requirement is that another person has in fact committed the crime charged. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal act of another if no crime was committed by the other person in the first place. But if you do find that a crime was committed, then you must consider whether the defendant aided or abetted the commission of that crime. And here we're talking about the two substantive offenses. In order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associated himself in some way with the crime, and that he willfully and knowingly and with the specific intent required for the commission of the substantive crime seeks by some act to help make the crime succeed.

Participation in a crime is willful if action is taken voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intention to do something that the law forbids, or, in the case of a failure to act, with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with a bad purpose, either to disobey or to disregard the law.

The mere presence of the defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence by the defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.

An aider and abettor must have some interest in the criminal venture. You may not infer that the defendant was guilty of participating in criminal conduct merely from the fact that he associated with another person who was guilty of wrongdoing.

To determine whether defendant aided or abetted the commission of bank fraud or money laundering, the two substantive counts, ask yourselves these questions:

Did he participate in the crime charged as something he wished to bring about? Did he associate himself with the criminal venture, knowingly and willfully and with the specific intent to commit the crime? And did he seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed?

If the defendant did, then he is an aider and abettor and therefore guilty of the offense. If he did not, then he is not an aider and abettor and is not guilty of that offense.

I'm going to pause for a second and catch my breath before we turn to the conspiracy counts.

So let's turn to the conspiracy counts, they are charged in Counts One, Two, Four and Six of the indictment.

There is four conspiracies charged.

Defendant Mr. Atilla is also charged in four conspiracy counts. He's charged in participating in conspiracies to (i) violate federal statutes that make it unlawful to defraud the United States; (ii) violate the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA; (iii) commit bank fraud; and (iv) commit money laundering.

Three and four, those are the substantive counts that I addressed earlier.

Each of the four conspiracy counts will be discussed in some detail below. It may be helpful when you get in the jury room to read through the indictment when considering these counts. Indeed, that may help you with respect to any or all of the counts, so I encourage you to do that.

A conspiracy to commit a crime is an entirely separate and different offense from the substantive crime or crimes that may be the objective of the conspiracy. The essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement or understanding to violate the law, and thus, a conspiracy may exist even if it should fail in its purposes.

Consequently, in a conspiracy, there is no need to prove that the crime or crimes that were the objective of the conspiracy were actually committed. The point is that the crime or crimes that were the objectives of the conspiracy need not have been actually committed for a conspiracy to exist.

So, for example, even if you do not find that the defendant committed the substantive count of bank fraud, you may still find him guilty of committing the alleged conspiracy to commit bank fraud.

So the first conspiracy count charges that from at

least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant agreed with others to impair, impede, and obstruct the lawful and legitimate governmental functions and operations of the United States Department of Treasury.

And with regard to Count One, we refer to Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 371, which provides as follows:

If two or more persons conspire to defraud the United States, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each is guilty of an offense against the United States.

So let's talk about the elements of this first conspiracy. There is going to be three elements.

To sustain its burden of proof with respect to the crime of conspiracy to defraud the United States, the government must separately prove beyond a reasonable doubt that follow the following elements:

First, the existence of the conspiracy charged, that is, with respect to Count One of the indictment, the existence of an agreement or understanding to impair, impede, obstruct or defeat the lawful and legitimate functions and operations of the United States Department of Treasury; and

Two, that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of that conspiracy.

In addition, with respect to the conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment, the conspiracy to defraud the

United States, the government must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt a third element, which is as follows:

Third, that some member of the conspiracy, not necessarily the defendant, knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy during the life of the conspiracy.

So let's consider these three elements with respect to Count One of the indictment, that Count One conspiracy, we'll consider the three separately.

Element one. The existence of a conspiracy.

What is a conspiracy? A conspiracy is a combination, agreement, or an understanding of two or more persons to accomplish by concerted action a criminal or unlawful purpose. In the first conspiracy, the conspiracy to defraud the United States, the unlawful purpose alleged to have been the object of the conspiracy, which is charged in Count One, was to impair, impede or obstruct the lawful and legitimate governmental functions and operations of the United States Department of Treasury by deceit, craft, or trickery, or means that are dishonest.

The gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful combination or agreement to violate the law. The conspiracies alleged here are the agreements to commit certain crimes, and as I said before, they are entirely distinct and separate offenses from the actual commission of any of the

alleged crimes. In order to show that a conspiracy existed, the evidence must show that two or more persons in some way or manner, through any contrivance, explicitly or implicitly, came to an understanding to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan.

To show a conspiracy, the government is not required to show that two or more persons sat around a table and entered into a solemn pact, orally or in writing, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the law and spelling out all of its details. Common sense tells you that when people in fact agree to enter a criminal conspiracy, much is left to the unexpressed understanding. It is rare that a conspiracy can be proven by direct evidence of an explicit agreement.

It is sufficient if two or more persons in some way or manner, formally or informally, impliedly or tacitly came to a common understanding, a common plan that will violate the law.

In determining whether there has been an unlawful agreement as alleged, you may consider the alleged acts and the conduct of the alleged co-conspirators that were done to carry out the criminal purpose. The adage "actions speak louder than words" applies here. Often the only evidence that is available with respect to the existence of a conspiracy is that of disconnected acts and conduct on the part of the alleged individual co-conspirators. When taken all together and considered as a whole, those acts and conduct may warrant the

inference that a conspiracy existed as conclusively as would direct proof.

So, you must first determine whether or not the proof established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the conspiracies as charged in the indictment. In considering this first element, you should consider all the evidence which has been admitted with respect to the conduct and statements of each of the alleged co-conspirators, and such inferences as may reasonably be drawn from them. It is sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy, if, from the proof of all the relevant facts and circumstances, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of two alleged co-conspirators met in an understanding way to accomplish, by the means alleged, at least one of the unlawful objectives of the conspiracy.

The objects of a conspiracy are the illegal goals the co-conspirators agree or hope to achieve. Count One charges that the goal or object of the conspiracy was to impair, impede, or obstruct the lawful and legitimate governmental functions and operations of the United States Treasury in its enforcement of economic sanctions laws and regulations against Iran administered by that agency.

In order to find the defendant impaired, impeded, or obstructed a legitimate governmental function, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the object of the conspiracy was to interfere with or obstruct one of the United States' lawful

government functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or by means that are dishonest. The specific intent to obstruct includes making it more difficult for the government to carry out its lawful functions and that the scheme depend on dishonest or deceitful means. Actual contact between the defendant and an official of the United States government is not an element of the crime, nor is it necessary for you to find that the government was subjected to any loss of money or property as a result of the conspiracy. It is also not necessary for you to find that the impairment violated any separate law. What is required is that the object of the conspiracy was to interfere with or obstruct one of the United States lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or by means that are dishonest.

As I will explain in more detail when we come to Count Two, the United States has imposed economic sanctions or legal restrictions on trade and transactions involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States Department of Treasury administers and enforces these laws, including two offices called the Office of Foreign Assets Control, often referred to by its initials OFAC, and the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.

I instruct you, as a matter of law, that the administration of the economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes a legitimate function of the

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government of the United States.

Element two. Membership in the conspiracy.

If you conclude that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment existed, you must next determine whether the defendant has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purposes and in furtherance of its unlawful objectives.

To satisfy its burden, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly, willfully and unlawfully entered into the conspiracy, into the agreement, and that he did so with a criminal intent, that is, with a purpose to violate the law, and that he agreed to take part in the conspiracy to promote and cooperate in its unlawful objectives.

I've previously defined the terms "knowingly," "willfully," and "unlawfully," and those same definitions apply here.

Before a defendant can be found to have been a conspirator, you must first find that he or she knowingly joined the unlawful agreement or plan. The key question is whether the defendant joined the conspiracy with an awareness of at least some of the basic aims and purposes of the unlawful agreement.

Knowledge is often a matter of inference from proven

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We cannot look into a person's mind and know what that facts. person is thinking. It is not necessary that a defendant be fully informed as to all the details of the conspiracy in order to justify an inference of guilty knowledge on his or her part. To have knowledge of the conspiracy, a defendant need not have known the full extent of the conspiracy or all of its activities or all of its participants. Nor is it necessary that a defendant know every other member of the conspiracy. In fact, a defendant may know only one other member of the conspiracy, and still be a co-conspirator. Nor is it necessary that a defendant receive any monetary benefit from participating in the conspiracy or have a financial stake in the outcome, as long as he in fact participated in the conspiracy in the manner I have explained. If you find that the defendant has a financial stake in the outcome of the alleged conspiracy, then you may consider that as a factor in deciding whether he was a member of the conspiracy.

For the co-conspirators to have acted with specific intent to deceive or defraud means that they must have known of the fraudulent nature of the scheme and acted with the intent that it succeed. In other words, to act with an intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with a specific intent to deceive, ordinarily, but not necessarily, for the purpose of causing some loss to another or to bring some gain to oneself.

It is not required that the government show that the

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co-conspirators, in addition to knowing what they were doing and deliberately doing it, also knew that they were violating some particular federal statute.

Let me say that again.

It is not required that the government show that the co-conspirators, in addition to knowing what they were doing and deliberately doing it, also knew that they were violating some particular federal statute. But the co-conspirators must have acted with the intent to help carry out some essential step in the execution of the scheme to defraud that is alleged in the indictment.

The question of a co-conspirator's intent is a question of fact that you are called upon to decide, just as you determine any other fact at issue. Intent to defraud involves the state of a person's mind, and the purpose with which he acted at the time of the acts in question and at the time they occurred. Direct proof of knowledge and fraudulent intent is almost never available, and is not required to find that such proof existed. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that as of a given time in the past he committed an act with fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not required.

The ultimate facts of knowledge and criminal intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence based on a person's outward manifestations, his or her

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words, his or her conduct, his or her acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence, and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Circumstantial evidence, if believed, is, as I noted before, of no less value than direct evidence.

Hold on.

Relevant in this regard may be the conduct of the persons you find to be members of the conspiracies charged, which, in light of the other evidence in the case, may tend to prove knowledge, intent, or willfulness. Thus, for example, you may consider as relevant any conduct engaged in by the co-conspirators which has the effect of concealing their activities, including false statements made to others concerning material facts or false notations and reports or other documents submitted to others concerning material facts. All are conduct from which willfulness may be inferred.

On the other hand, you may consider any evidence that the co-conspirators engaged in certain activities openly and without an attempt to conceal or voluntarily and honestly brought their full involvement to light as evidence of a lack of willfulness.

The duration and extent of a defendant's participation in a conspiracy has no bearing on the issue of defendant's A defendant need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset. A defendant may have joined it for any purpose at any

time in its progress, and that defendant will still be held responsible for all that was done before that defendant joined, and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while the defendant was a member.

Each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. Some conspirators play major roles, while others play minor roles in the scheme. An equal role is not what the law requires. In fact, even a single act may be sufficient to draw defendant within the ambit of the conspiracy.

However, I want to caution you that mere association by one person with one who is a conspirator does not make that person, the first person, a member of the conspiracy, even when he or she knows that a conspiracy is taking place. Mere presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled with knowledge that a crime is taking place, is not sufficient to support a conviction of that crime. In other words, knowledge without participation is not sufficient to convict a person of conspiracy. What is required or necessary is that the defendant, the alleged conspirator, participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purposes, and with an intent to aid in the accomplishment of its unlawful objective.

In sum, the government has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, must have

intentionally engaged, advised, or assisted in them for the purpose of furthering an illegal undertaking. The government has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant thereby became a knowing and willing participant in the unlawful agreement — that is to say, a conspirator.

A conspiracy, once formed, is presumed to continue until either its objective is accomplished or there is some other affirmative act of termination by its members. So, too, once a person is found to be a member of a conspiracy, that person is presumed to continue being a member in the venture until the venture is terminated, unless it is shown by some affirmative proof that the person withdrew and disassociated himself from it.

Element three of the first conspiracy which we're still considering. This is the third element. And with respect only to this conspiracy, that is to say the conspiracy to defraud the United States as set forth in Count One of the indictment, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud the United States as set forth in Count One of the indictment by at least one of the co-conspirators, and was committed in the Southern District of New York.

I instruct you, as a matter of law, that Manhattan falls within the geographic boundaries of the Southern District of New York.

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The purpose of the overt act requirement, which applies in this first conspiracy, but not in the others -we'll get to that -- but the purpose of the overt act requirement in Count One of the indictment is that the law requires there to have been something more than mere agreement to reach a conviction of this conspiracy. There must also be some overt act or action that must have been taken by at least one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. you find that an overt act has been committed, you must be unanimous as to which act it was. You must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the members of the charged conspiracy, not necessarily the defendant in this case, took some step or action in furtherance of the conspiracy in the Southern District of New York at some point in time during the life of the conspiracy. determining whether an overt act occurred within the Southern District of New York, you need not find that any co-conspirator was physically present within this district, as long as you find that some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred within the district.

The overt act element is a requirement that the agreement went beyond the mere talking stage, the mere agreement stage. The requirement of an overt act is a requirement that some action be taken during the life of the conspiracy by one of the co-conspirators to further the

conspiracy.

You are further instructed that the overt act need not have been committed at precisely the time alleged in the indictment. It is sufficient if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it occurred at or about the time and place stated, as long as it occurred while the conspiracy was still in existence.

You should bear in mind that the overt act, standing alone, may be an innocent, lawful act. Frequently, however, an apparently innocent act loses its harmless character if it is a step in carrying out, promoting, aiding or assisting the conspiratorial scheme.

Let's talk a minute about the time of a conspiracy. The indictment charges that the conspiracy charged in Count One, and, for that matter, Counts Two, Four and Six, and all the conspiracies, occurred from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015. It is not essential that the government prove that the conspiracies started and ended on those specific dates. Indeed, it is sufficient if you find that in fact the charged conspiracies were formed and that they existed for some time within the period set forth in the indictment, and with respect to Count One, that at least one overt act occurred in the conspiracy to defraud the United States, and that it was committed in furtherance of the charged conspiracy within that time period.

One down in the conspiracy area. Now I'm turning to the second conspiracy alleged in the indictment.

This is called a conspiracy to violate a license, order, regulation, or prohibition pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA. And it is set forth in Count Two of the indictment.

Count Two of the indictment charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy from at least in or about 2010 up to and including in or about 2015 to violate a license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, otherwise known as IEEPA.

United States has adopted certain restrictions called economic sanctions on transactions with or involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among other things, these sanctions prohibit causing the export of a service directly or indirectly to Iran or the government of Iran from the United States or by a United States person. In addition, during the relevant time period, the sanctions allowed penalties against foreign financial institutions with bank accounts in the United States if those foreign financial institutions violated certain rules on assisting transactions with or for the benefit of Iran.

I've already instructed you as to what a conspiracy is and how you should go about determining whether one existed and whether the defendant knowingly joined and participated in it,

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transactions.

and those same principles apply to Count Two as they did to Count One. However, no overt act is required for this second conspiracy count. One was required for the first conspiracy. It is not required not second conspiracy.

As I've stated, the object of the conspiracy charged in Count Two is the violation of IEEPA. A violation of IEEPA has itself the following elements:

First, the violation of any license, order,
regulation, or prohibition issued pursuant to IEEPA; and
Second, the violation was committed willfully; and
Third, that the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
OFAC, had not issued a license to engage in the charged

As I've mentioned, you need not find that a substantive violation of the IEEPA actually occurred, only that the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in a conspiracy to engage in conduct that would have violated IEEPA.

Let's talk a minute about license, order, regulation, and prohibitions. In order to prove that the defendant conspired to commit an IEEPA offense, the government must prove that defendant agreed with others to violate a license, order, regulation or prohibition issued pursuant to IEEPA. I instruct you that the following orders, regulations, and prohibitions were in effect at all times relevant to Count Two:

First, orders, regulations, or prohibitions issued

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pursuant to IEEPA provided that the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology or services to Iran, or the government of Iran, is prohibited unless the transaction was for the export of agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices or was authorized by a license from OFAC. In this regard, I instruct you that the execution of dollar denominated money transfers from the United States on behalf of another, whether or not performed for a fee, constitutes the exportation of a service. Services may be provided indirectly, for example, if funds are transferred to Iran on or behalf of an Iranian person or business through an intermediary, or if they are transferred to a third party for the benefit of, or on behalf of, the government of Iran, or if they are transferred to a third party acting as an agent of the government of Iran.

The government of Iran means the state and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran, and the National Iranian Oil Company, also referred to as NIOC. The government of Iran also includes any entity or business owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the government of Iran, and any person acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for or on behalf of

the government of the Iran.

I was instructing you that the following orders, regulations and prohibitions were in effect at the times relevant to this Count Two, and that was the first set of orders, regulations, or prohibitions that were in effect.

The second set of orders, regulations, or prohibitions issued pursuant to IEEPA prohibited any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions I've just described as well as any conspiracy formed to violate those prohibitions.

And third, it includes orders, regulations or prohibitions issued pursuant to the IEEPA required the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit a foreign financial institution's use of correspondent banking accounts or so-called payable-through bank accounts in the United States, or to impose strict conditions on the use of correspondent banking accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States, if the foreign financial institution knowingly conducted or facilitated certain types of financial transactions with Iran, or for the benefit of the government of Iran.

Beginning on July 31, 2012, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury was required to impose sanctions against any person if there was a determination that the person materially assisted,

sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support for or goods or services in support of NIOC, the National Iranian Oil Company, NICO, Naftiran Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of Iran, or the purchase or acquisition of United States bank notes or precious metals by the government of Iran.

And beginning on or about February 6, 2013, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury was required to impose sanctions against foreign financial institutions if the foreign financial institutions knowingly conducted or facilitated any financial transaction with respect to the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran, unless the funds were used only for bilateral trade between the foreign country and Iran with any funds owed to Iran deposited in an account within that foreign country, and unless the transaction was for the export of agricultural commodities, medicine or medical devices.

Then beginning on July 1, 2013, the United States

Secretary of the Treasury was required to impose sanctions

against any person if there were a determination that the

person who sold, supplied or transferred, directly or

indirectly, precious metals directly or indirectly to or from

Iran.

We're still under the category I was giving you instances of licenses, orders, regulations, etc. There is a

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fourth category that includes any transaction which avoided, had the purpose of avoiding, caused a violation of, or attempted to violate any of the prohibitions that I have already described, or any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions, was prohibited.

Under this last or this fourth provision or category, the government must establish that the conspirators agreed to engage in transactions for the purpose of avoiding the prohibition. It is not necessary for the government to prove that the conspirators' only reason for agreeing to engage in the transaction was to avoid the prohibition. It is sufficient if it was a dominant reason for the conspirators to have agreed to engage in the transaction. By the same token, it is not necessary for the foreign financial institutions to have been sanctioned before the conspirators agreed to engage in the transaction for the purpose of evading or avoiding the prohibitions that could result in the imposition of sanctions. It is sufficient if the conspirators believed that the sanctions could be imposed, and acted in that belief in agreeing to engage in a transaction or transactions designed to avoid the imposition of those sanctions. In other words, avoiding the imposition of sanctions by unlawfully concealing the true nature of a transaction would violate the prohibition on evading or avoiding the prohibition.

The second element of an IEEPA violation is that the

defendant acted willfully. A defendant acts willfully if he acted intentionally and purposefully with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. And here, it would be to violate the U.S. embargo on certain transactions with Iran. However, the government does not need to prove that the defendant was aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct would violate. The defendant does not have to know that his conduct would violate a particular law, executive order or federal regulation, but he must act with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.

And the third element that the government must prove to establish the IEEPA conspiracy is that at the time of the transactions at issue, the defendant had not obtained a license to conduct such transactions from the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC.

With regard to this, I've said it before, but with regard to this second conspiracy, no overt act is required. So unlike the case of the Count One conspiracy, where, as I said, an overt act must be proven, it is not necessary for the government to prove the commission of any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to violate IEEPA set forth in Count Two, as long as the government proves that the conspiracy charged in Count Two existed, and that the defendant was a knowing and intentional member of that conspiracy.

A defendant's conduct -- we're talking now about the IEEPA conspiracy -- is not willful if it was the result of a good-faith understanding that he was acting within the requirements of the law. A defendant may not be held liable for a violation of IEEPA if the defendant acted, or chose not to act, in a good-faith belief that he was complying with the licenses, orders, regulations, or prohibitions issued pursuant to IEEPA.

In other words, if you find that the defendant acted in good faith, then he may not be convicted of a conspiracy to violate IEEPA.

We move along to the next conspiracy, next two conspiracies, the bank fraud conspiracy and the money laundering conspiracy.

The bank fraud conspiracy is set forth in Count Four of the indictment. Count Four of the indictment charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy to commit bank fraud. In summary, Count Four charges that from at least in or about 2010, up to and including in or about 2015, the defendant agreed with others to execute a scheme to defraud a United States financial institution, namely HSBC Bank U.S.A., Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, UBS Bank U.S.A., BNY Mellon, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo Bank.

I've already instructed you as to what a conspiracy is

and how you should go about determining whether one existed and whether the defendant knowingly joined and participated in it.

Those same principles apply to Count Four as they did to Counts One and Two. And it is not necessary in a bank fraud conspiracy for the government to prove an overt act was committed.

The object of the conspiracy charged in Count Four is bank fraud in violation, as we've discussed, of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 1344, and I've already explained to you the elements of bank fraud when we discussed Count Three at the beginning. You should rely on those instructions in connection with Count Four, the conspiracy to commit bank fraud as well.

And now moving to money laundering conspiracy, which is Count Six of the indictment. I'll turn to the money laundering conspiracy charged in Count Six. I've already instructed you as to what a conspiracy is and how you should go about determining whether one existed and whether the defendant knowingly joined and participated in it. Those same principles apply to Count Six. It is not necessary in a money laundering conspiracy for the government to prove an overt act was committed.

The object of the conspiracy charged in Count Six is money laundering in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (a)(2)(A), and I've already explained the elements

of money laundering to you when discussing Count Five at the beginning of these instructions. It was actually the second count that we talked about. You should rely on those instructions in connection with Count Six as well.

I remind you that the crime of conspiracy to violate federal law is an independent offense. It is separate from the actual violation of any specific federal laws. You may find defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit money laundering, even if you find that the money laundering itself that was an object of the conspiracy was not actually committed.

Now we're going to talk about something called conscious avoidance.

So this relates to the conspiracy counts, the four conspiracy counts that I've talked to you about, and the concept of knowledge. I need to say one more thing about that concept of knowledge.

In determining whether the defendant acted with the necessary knowledge, you may consider whether the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been clear. I've told you before that acts done knowingly must be a product of a defendant's conscious intention, not the product of carelessness or negligence, for example.

A person, however, cannot willfully blind himself to what is obvious and disregard what is plainly before him. A

person may not intentionally remain ignorant of facts that are material and important to his conduct in order to escape the consequences of the criminal law.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally participated in a conspiracy, but that the defendant deliberately and consciously avoided learning or confirming certain facts about the specific objectives of the conspiracy, then you may infer from his willful and deliberate avoidance of knowledge that the defendant understood the objectives or goals of the conspiracy.

We refer to this notion of blinding yourself to what is staring you in the face as "conscious avoidance." An argument of conscious avoidance, however, is not a substitute for proof. It is simply another fact you may consider in deciding what the defendant knew.

There is a difference between knowingly participating in a conspiracy, on the one hand, and knowing the object or objects or the purpose or purposes of the conspiracy on the other. Conscious avoidance cannot be used as a substitute for finding that the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy, that is, that the defendant knew that he was becoming a party to an agreement to accomplish an alleged illegal purpose. It is in fact logically impossible for a defendant to join a conspiracy unless he knows the conspiracy exists. The defendant must know that the conspiracy is there.

However, in deciding whether the defendant knew the objectives of the conspiracy, you may consider whether the defendant was aware of a high probability that an objective of the conspiracy was to commit the crime or crimes charged in the object of the conspiracy, and nevertheless participated in the conspiracy. You must judge from all of the circumstances and all of the proof whether the government did or did not satisfy its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

So, in other words, if you find that the defendant was aware of a high probability that a fact was so, and that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard of the facts, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly. However, if you find that the defendant actually believed the fact was not so, then he may not have acted knowingly with respect to whatever charge you are considering.

So those are the six crimes or charges alleged in the indictment.

We have some more general instructions and we're almost there.

As I noted at the beginning, the defendant is charged in six counts in the indictment. Each count charges the defendant with a different crime. You must consider each count of the indictment separately, and you must return a separate verdict on each count. The case on each count stands or falls upon the proof or lack of proof on that count. Your verdict on

any count should not control your decision on any other count.

In addition to all of the elements that I've been describing to you as elements of the various crimes we've been talking about, alleged crimes, with respect to each count charged in the indictment, you must consider the issue of venue, namely, whether any act in furtherance of the unlawful activity occurred within the Southern District of New York. As I said before, the Southern District of New York includes

If the crime charged was committed in more than one district, venue is proper in any district in which the crime was begun, continued or completed. And thus, venue will lie in the Southern District of New York if you find that any part of the crime took place here.

The government's burden of proof with respect to establishing venue under each count of the indictment is by what we call a preponderance of the evidence. With respect to venue, it's not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is by preponderance of the evidence. To prove something by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that something is more likely true than not true. This only applies to venue. It is determined by considering all the evidence and deciding which evidence is more convincing. If the evidence appears to be equally balanced or if you cannot say on which side it weighs heavier, you decide the issue of venue against the

government. If you find that venue has not been proven, then you must find the defendant not guilty as to that particular count.

Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom in accordance with my instructions. You must disregard completely any report that you may have read in the press, seen on TV or on the internet, or heard on the radio, assuming there were any. Indeed, it would be unfair to consider such reports since they are not evidence, and the parties have no opportunity to contradict their accuracy or otherwise address them. In short, it would be a violation of your oath as jurors to allow yourselves to be influenced in any manner by such publicity.

You've heard evidence during the trial that witnesses have discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court. Although you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, you should keep in mind that there is nothing either unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying so that the witness can be aware of the subjects he or she will be questioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits before being questioned about them. Such consultation helps conserve your time and the Court's time. And in fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without having such a

consultation beforehand.

Again, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his or her testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within your discretion.

In this case you've heard evidence in the form of stipulations of testimony. A stipulation of testimony is an agreement among the parties that, if called as a witness, the person would have given certain testimony. You must accept as true the fact that the witness would have given that testimony. However, it is for you, the jurors, to determine the effect to be given that testimony.

Recordings of conversations and transcripts of those recordings have been admitted into evidence in this case. In connection with these recordings, you heard testimony that parts, if not all of the conversations, were in Turkish. For that reason, it was necessary to obtain translations of those conversations into English. These transcripts were admitted into evidence. Remember that the jury is the ultimate fact finder, and as with all of the evidence, you may give the transcripts such weight, if any, as you believe they deserve.

The defendant in a criminal case never has any duty to testify or come forward with any evidence. This is because, as I've told you, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the government at all times, and the defendant is

presumed innocent. In this case, the defendant did testify, and he was subject to cross-examination like other witnesses. You should examine and evaluate the testimony of the defendant just as you would the testimony of any witness.

In determining whether the government has proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, you should not consider the question of possible punishment in the event you were to find the defendant guilty of one or more of the counts. Under our system, sentencing or punishment is exclusively the function of the Court, it is not your concern, and you should not give any consideration to that issue in determining what your verdict will be.

Let's talk about charts, summaries, and drawings for a moment. Some charts, summaries, and drawings were shown to you to make the other evidence more meaningful and to aid you in considering that evidence. They are no better than the testimony or the documents upon which they are based, and are not themselves independent evidence. Therefore, you are to give no greater consideration to these charts, summaries or drawings than you would give to the evidence upon which they are based.

It is for you to decide whether the charts, summaries or drawings correctly present the information in the testimony or the documents on which they were based. You're entitled to consider the charts, summaries and drawings if you find that

they are of assistance to you in analyzing the evidence and understanding the evidence.

You've heard testimony about evidence that was seized in various searches. Evidence obtained from these searches was properly admitted in this case and may be properly considered by you. Whether you approve or disapprove of how it was obtained should not enter into your deliberations, because I now instruct you that the government's and the defense's use of this evidence is entirely lawful.

Under your oath as jurors, you are not to be swayed by sympathy. You are to be guided solely by the evidence in the case and the crucial question that you must ask yourselves as you sift through this evidence is has the government proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. You are to determine this solely on the basis of the evidence and subject to the law as I have charged you.

You've heard the testimony of various members or past members of law enforcement. The fact that a witness may be or was employed by the government as a law enforcement official or employee does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness. At the same time, it is quite legitimate for counsel to try to attack the credibility of a law enforcement witness on the grounds that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or

professional interest in the outcome of the case.

It is your decision, after reviewing all of the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of the law enforcement or government employee witnesses, as it is with every other type of witness, and to give to that testimony the weight you find it deserves.

So now, ladies and gentlemen, you're about to go into the jury room and begin your deliberations. All of the evidence and exhibits will be given to you at the start of deliberations.

If you want any of the testimony read back or recording of an exhibit played, you may request that also. But please remember that if you do ask for testimony, the reporter must search through his or her notes, the court reporter, and the lawyers must agree on what portions of testimony may be called for. And if they disagree, then I must resolve those disagreements. That can be a time-consuming process. So please try to be as specific as you possibly can in requesting portions of the testimony, if in fact you do.

Your request for testimony, and in fact any communication with the Court, should be made to me in writing, and signed by your foreperson -- I'm going to come back to the foreperson in a minute -- and given to one of the marshals outside the jury room.

In any event, do not tell me or anyone else how the

jury stands on any issue until after a verdict is reached.

Many of you have taken notes during parts of the trial. Please recall my earlier instruction regarding note taking. It is entirely appropriate. Notes can be useful to focus a note taker's attention and may aid the recollection of the note taker, but they are not evidence. Notes should be used solely to refresh the note taker's recollection of the testimony, and are not a substitute for the transcript of the testimony which has been taken down verbatim by the court reporter.

And please remember that if notes were taken of the lawyers' arguments, the lawyers' arguments are not evidence.

The government, to prevail, must prove the essential elements of any crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt as has been explained in these instructions. If it succeeds, your verdict should be guilty. If it fails, your verdict should be not guilty.

A verdict must be unanimous. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror; whether your verdict is guilty or not guilty, it must be unanimous.

Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty solely upon the basis of such evidence. Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion. Each should, however, exchange views with his or her fellow jurors. That is the very purpose of jury

deliberations -- to discuss and consider the evidence, to 1 2 3 4

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listen to the arguments of fellow jurors, to present your individual views, to consult with one another, and to reach an agreement based solely and entirely on the evidence, if you can do so without surrendering your own individual judgment.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, after consideration with your fellow jurors of the evidence in the But you should not hesitate to change an opinion that, after discussion with your fellow jurors, appears incorrect. If, after carefully considering the evidence and arguments of your fellow jurors, you hold a conscientious view that differs from the others, you are not required to change your position simply because you are outnumbered. Your final vote must reflect your conscientious belief as to how the issues should be decided.

I said a minute ago we'd come back to the foreperson and now let me talk about that. When you get into the jury room, before you begin your deliberations, I request that you select someone to be the foreperson. Your foreperson will preside over the deliberations and speak for you all in open court. The foreperson has no greater voice or authority than any other juror. The foreperson will send out and sign any notes, and when the jury has reached a verdict, he or she will notify the marshal that the jury has reached a verdict.

I'm going to give you a verdict sheet form to be

filled in by the jury and signed by each juror when you're finished. The purpose of the questions on the form is to help us, that is to say, counsel and myself, to understand what your findings are. I will hand this form to Christine who will give it to you so that you may record the decision of the jury with respect to each count in each question.

The order of the questions corresponds to the order that the six counts were described to you in these instructions.

No inference is to be drawn from the way the questions are worded as to what the answer should be. The questions are not to be taken as any indication that I have any opinion as to how they should be answered. I have no such opinion. And even if I did, it would be not be binding on you, the jury.

Before the jury attempts to answer any question, you should read all the questions on the verdict form and make sure that everybody understands each question.

Before you answer the questions, you should deliberate in the jury room and discuss the evidence that relates to the questions that you must answer. And when you've considered the questions thoroughly, and the evidence that relates to those questions, record the answers to the questions on the form that I will give you. Remember, all answers must be unanimous.

So I'm almost finished with these charges and my instructions to you. And I thank you once again for your

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patience and attentiveness over these past three-plus weeks.

And now, finally, I say this not because I think it is necessary, but because it is the tradition of this court. I'll remind the jurors to be polite and respectful to each other, as I'm sure you will be, in the course of your deliberations and so that each juror may have his or her position made clear to all the others.

I also remind you once again that your oath is to decide without fear or favor and to decide the issues based solely on the evidence and my instructions on the law.

So I thank you very much. I ask you to just remain seated for a minute or two while I talk to the lawyers briefly.

(At the sidebar)

THE COURT: Does either side have any objection to the way the instructions were read as opposed to the content of the instructions?

MS. FLEMING: No, your Honor.

MR. DENTON: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you all collected the exhibits?

MR. ROCCO: Yes.

THE COURT: Great.

(In open court)

THE COURT: Will the marshal please step forward.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Sir, if you can raise your right

25 | hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear that you will keep the jurors impaneled and sworn in this cause together in some private and convenient place, that you shall suffer no one to speak to them, nor shall you speak to them yourself without direction of this Court, unless it is to ask them if they have agreed upon a verdict, so help you God?

THE MARSHAL: I do.

THE COURT: At this point I'm going to ask the first 12 of you, that is to say everybody in the first row, everybody in the second row, and the two of you in the third row, to go with the marshal to the jury room.

(Jury begins deliberations. Time noted 12:35 p.m.)

THE COURT: So you two jurors, as to whom we are very grateful, turn out to be our alternates. And we thank you for your patience and your participation.

We usually, and I am in this instance as well, not going to discharge you as jurors. We're going to let you go home, but we're not going to discharge you until the jury has finished and reached a verdict. It does occur on occasion that one of the jurors can't function as a juror for whatever reason, and that we may nevertheless call on one of you or both as alternates.

So we will thank you again, and we'll call you when the jury has reached a verdict or in the event that there is a need for your service back down here, if that's okay with you.

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1 | Thanks again.

(Alternate jurors excused)

THE COURT: It's 12:35. We ordered lunch for the jury. And if you would just leave how we can contact the lawyers in case we get a note or hear from the jury. Christine will call you or somebody will. So we probably have your contact information or no?

MR. KAMARAJU: We'll give it to Christine again just to make sure.

THE COURT: What about the defense?

MR. ROCCO: Same, your Honor.

THE COURT: Cell phone or whatever.

MS. FLEMING: I have a contact sheet with everybody's information. I'll give it to Christine.

THE COURT: Thanks so much everybody.

MS. FLEMING: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. KAMARAJU: Thank you, your Honor.

(Recess pending verdict)

(In open court; jury not present)

THE COURT: So, what I thought I would do is call in the jury and tell them that we usually end at 4:45 and to come back tomorrow at 9:15. So that's essentially my plan.

We got a note early, unsigned, but it is from the jury asking for supplies. I'll read it to you. It just says:

Could we have need glasses seat one -- I think somebody left a

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pair of eyeglasses -- two, highlighters; three, Post-its; four, pens; five, coffee, tea, milk and hot water.

That's it. Unsigned. So, if that's okay with you, that's what I'm going to do.

MR. LOCKARD: Yes, your Honor.

MS. FLEMING: We just took boxes of it out of here.

THE COURT: Of supplies you mean?

MS. FLEMING: We could have given it to them.

(Jury present. Time noted 4:40 p.m.)

THE COURT: I just wanted to mention to you our typical practice is to conclude each day at 4:45, trial or deliberations, if that's okay with you. And to remind you of my instructions that apply, continue to apply.

As far as deliberations are concerned, they should only occur in the jury room when all 12 of you are together. So, and if you would either tonight before you leave, if you could send me a note indicating who the foreperson is, if one has been selected, and then you're free to go.

So see you tomorrow morning at 9:15. Once all of you are assembled, you can start deliberating again. Okay? Great. Nice to see you.

(Jury excused; time noted 4:45 p.m.)

THE COURT: Thanks a lot.

MR. KAMARAJU: You don't want to see us tomorrow morning? We'll just wait for the jury.

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intended.

THE COURT: You can sleep in tomorrow. 1 MS. FLEMING: You don't want us here at 6? 2 3 THE COURT: Did you notice the progression? I'm an early riser. Anyway I'll see you tomorrow, 9:15 is fine. 4 5 MS. FLEMING: Thanks, Judge. 6 (Pause) 7 (At 4:50, a note was received from the jury) 8 (In open court; jury and defendant not present) 9 THE COURT: I do have a note, but I guess nobody's 10 here. 11 MS. FLEMING: Judge, we have to waive Mr. Atilla's 12 presence, which we are. 13 THE COURT: Okay. I don't think it is of much 14 consequence. But, if he wanted to be here, that would be fine. 15 I was hoping actually that the audience would be here, because I was going to start by saying that, you know, my rule 16 17 about the jury should not be contacted by anybody, and they should report to me or Christine if they are, that's a two-way 18 street. That means that the people in the audience need to 19

jury room, quite literally. So I'll probably say it again tomorrow. I mean, it's good for you to hear it, but it's really for them that it was

stay away from the jurors as well, including not peeking in the

So, now as to the note: Hi, Judge Berman. Here are

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some requests for tomorrow.

I think they're pretty straightforward, but there is one I'm not sure of and you'll have to tell me.

One, photo poster boards, of which there were I think some. But anyway you'll have to think about it and talk before I respond tomorrow.

Two, Zarrab's flow charts. Three, arrest video, looks like DVD, and then it says I am the foreperson and it's Juror Number 12.

You had a bet?

MR. ROCCO: She's formidable. I was watching her during the trial --

No. I thought you had a bet among THE COURT: yourselves.

MR. ROCCO: I lost and so did Ms. Fleming.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just being in the "Hi, Judge Berman" mode.

So would you please then come a little early, say 9 o'clock, and talk before that, that is to say the government and the defense, about how to respond to this. But one question I have is, is the arrest video in the jury room already?

MR. KAMARAJU: Yes.

THE COURT: Do they have a capability in there of I don't know. playing it?

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MR. KAMARAJU: Yes. THE COURT: They do? MR. KAMARAJU: I think they have a laptop. THE COURT: Okay. So if that's the case, then part of the note will be do you know you have it and do you have the capability of playing it. MR. KAMARAJU: We can identify the exhibit number specifically for them so they can pull it out easily. THE COURT: Okay. And the other two things I'll leave you to figure out what they are, and then we'll send them back tomorrow morning. Okay. Good to see you. See you tomorrow. (Adjourned until December 21, 2017, at 9 a.m.) 89